"SECOND" FBI REPORT
Report on the FBI's Investigation of the March 30,1997, Bombing in Cambodia.
Requested in the 1998 Foreign Appropriations Act (Public Law 105-118).
Delivered to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
November 24, 1998
AT approximately 8:30 am on March 30,1997, unidentified assailants detonated
four grenades during a Khmer National Party (KNP) political protest
demonstration led by Sam Rainsy, the KNP party
leader. (The KNP is one of three competing political parties in Cambodia, along with Hun Sen's
Cambodian People's Party (CPP) and Prince Norodom Ranariddh's FUNCINPEC party). The demonstration was held in
a park opposite the National Assembly in
Initial investigation indicated that two unknown subjects escaped on foot after
throwing two grenades from behind the KNP supporters. Conflicting reports were
also received that individual(s) either on a motorcycle and/or in a white sedan
had dropped two additional grenades. A unit of
heavily-armed troops in full combat assault uniforms was positioned near the
KNP speech platform. According to local media reports, these soldiers made no attempt to apprehend the
attackers and prevented KNP supporters from doing so.
Rainsy publicly blamed Second Prime Minister Hun Sen for the attack while Hun Sen's
party - the CPP - publicly blamed the Khmer Rouge. Hun Sen later blamed Rainsy for
staging the attack against himself.
Cambodian Police reports indicate between 16 and 20 people attending the
demonstration were killed and 150 wounded, many seriously. Sam Rainsy, the apparent
target of the attack, escaped without injury. Among those killed were two 13-year-old children, a 17-year-old student, Rainsy's
bodyguard, a journalist and several female garment workers. A Chinese journalist, who
suffered serious abdominal wounds, was among the
injured.
During the attack, Ron Abney, an
American citizen and Chief of the Delegation of the International Republican
Institute (IRI), sustained shrapnel wounds in the leg and was evacuated to Mt
Elizabeth Hospital in Singapore for medical treatment. He
was subsequently released to the care of his personal physician in Cochran, Georgia, on April 8, 1997.
CPP public statements indicated that there was an [un]usually light police presence, approximately 20 officers, considerably
less than present at previous KNP rallies. None of
these officers were injured. None of the previous
rallies had a military presence, which for the March
30,1997, rally was confirmed to be a detachment of Hun Sen's
bodyguards.
On March 31,1997, FBIHQ apprised the Terrorism and Violent Crime Section
(TVCS), Criminal Division, Department of Justice, (DOJ),
of the information available surrounding the incident and the injury of Mr Abney, and an opinion was rendered that, pursuant
to Title 18, US Code, Section 2332, which states
"it is a federal crime for a terrorist overseas to kill a US national, attempt to murder a US national, conspire
to murder a US national, or to engage in physical
violence a) with the intent to cause serious bodily injury to a US national or
b) with the result that serious bodily injury is caused to a US national, "the FBI has jurisdiction to initiate an
investigation into this matter.
On April 1,1997, First Deputy Director of the National
Police Chhay Bornlay
requested FBI assistance, especially sketch artist assistance, on behalf of FUNCINPEC. FBIHQ discussed this
Foreign Police co-operation request for FBI assistance with the Department of
State Office for Counterterrorism and decided that any request for FBI
assistance should come from the entire Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) and
not just one of the coalition partners.
On
The interview was conducted with the US Embassy Regional Security Officer
(RSO). Abney advised that while he did not believe he was
the intended target of the attack he would have been an ideal target of
opportunity.
On April 9,1997, the RGC formally requested the
assistance of an FBI sketch artist to draw composites provided by eyewitnesses. Also on that day, FBIHQ
provided the TVCS a copy of the interview with Ron Abney. Upon
review of the interview, the TVCS opined that, pursuant to Title 18, US Code, Section
2332a (Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction), the FBI had jurisdiction to
investigate the March 30, 1997, attack.
Based on the FBI's investigative jurisdiction and invitation by the RGC, the FBI sent an agent to
Cambodia in furtherance of this investigation. The
agent was advised by FBIHQ to work closely with the USDS Regional Security
Officer (RSO) in Cambodia. The Cambodian desk officer
at the State Department and the US Ambassador to Cambodia were both apprised by
the FBI of the FBI's investigative responsibility in this matter.
The
On April 24,1997, the FBI legal Attaché (Legat) in Bangkok, an FBI sketch artist and the ICA were briefed by
Ambassador Kenneth M. Quinn. Also, approval was obtained
for a second FBI agent to travel to Cambodia to assist in the investigation. The second FBI agent arrived in Cambodia on
April 29,1997.
On April 26,1997, FBI representatives met with Ambassador Quinn; the
RSO; Co-Deputy Prime Minister/Co-Minister of the
Interior Sar Kheng (Kheng serves in both capacities for the Cambodian People's
Party or CPP); Co-Minister of the Interior You Hockry
(FUNCINPEC); General Chhay Bornlay
(FUNCINPEC), advisor to You Hockry; and Deputy Director
General of the National Police Teng Savon.
Translation was provided by General Keo Sopheak, advisor to Sar Kheng. This meeting was primarily an introduction of
personnel and an expression of gratitude regarding the FBI's prompt response to
the Cambodian's request for investigative assistance. The
FBI requested that publicity regarding the FBI be kept to a minimum and
informed those present at the meeting that the FBI's instructions were to
investigate the injury of a US citizen during a terrorist attack. During
this meeting, the FBI was advised that General Teng Savon would command the
investigation and the primary FBI contacts would be Keo
Sopheak representing the CPP and Chhay
Bornlay representing FUNCINPEC.
The FBI proceeded with its investigation in Phnom Penh, in
concert with the Cambodian Commission consisting of representatives from both
the CPP and FUNCINPEC. During this investigation, every
effort was made by the FBI to conduct a criminal investigation in accordance
with the FBI's extra-territorial responsibilities and avoid involvement in
Cambodia's internal politics. After a week of joint
Commission investigative inactivity, numerous leads
and eyewitnesses were developed by the FBI ICA. With
the concurrence of the US Ambassador and Police Major General Savon, the ICA conducted extensive debriefings of
eyewitnesses who offered information to the FBI but refused to cooperate with
the Cambodian Police or the Investigation Commission.
In addition to eyewitness testimony, photographic
evidence was obtained from an additional witness. After
reviewing the photographs related to the incident, and
presenting a photospread to witnesses, it
was determined that one of the photos contained a subject who appears to be one
of the grenade throwers. Efforts were made to fully
identify this individual.
After the first week of the investigation, the
FBI team briefed the Ambassador of what they felt was insufficient cooperation
by the police, including the inability to question members of the military unit
guarding the compound of the Second Prime Minister. The
Ambassador offered to assist and it was jointly agreed that they would meet
with Interior Minister Sar Kheng
in an effort to enhance cooperation. On May 2, 1997, the ICA and Ambassador Quinn met with Co-Deputy Prime Minister (CPP) Sar Kheng.
Based on information obtained from witnesses, including
Sam Rainsy, it was learned that a long-standing feud
exists between former FUNCINPEC Secretary of the Treasury and KNP President, Sam Rainsy, and CPP
Second Prime Minister, Hun Sen. Sam
Rainsy claimed to have been surveilled
on several occasions prior to the March 30, 1997, grenade attack. On
March 26, 1997, the KNP requested a legal permit, issued
by the Ministry of Interior, to demonstrate. The
KNP obtained permission to demonstrate on March 29,1997.
Security was the responsibility of the Phnom Penh Municipal Police Force (PPMPF) and its Commander, Mok Chito, Hun Sen's nephew.
The PPMPF was not represented on the Investigation Commission and its Commander
was not made available for interview.
According to Sam Rainsy and retired Secretary of
State Kong Korm, 14 previous KNP demonstrations suffered only mild police harassment. Although a small number of police were initially
present prior to the rally, police presence was
unobserved as the rally began on March 30, 1997. After what appeared to be a
prearranged signal ordering a retreat of police officers, four
squads of Hun Sen's "Bodyguard Force" (2nd
Battalion, 17th Regiment) were deployed, in a linear
position along Street 7 on the park's West boundary. A
military unit has never been deployed at a civilian political rally in the past
according to Sam Rainsy.
On May 9, 1997, the ICA and six police officials interviewed Brigadier General Huy Pised [sic ], Major Chhin Savon and another soldier
at the Ministry of Interior Police General Staff Headquarters. General
Pised is the commanding general of Bodyguard Unit #2
of the 17th Division assigned to protect Second Prime Minister Hun Sen. Major Chhin Savon was the on-scene commander of 15 soldiers from
Bodyguard Unit #2 at the March 30, 1997, rally. During the interview, General
Pised and Major Savon
denied that anyone escaped through the perimeter. Furthermore, they
stated "We saw nothing."
On May 11, 1997, the ICA and Legat Bangkok interviewed
Sam Rainsy in Bangkok, Thailand. After
FBI representatives informed Rainsy that public
disclosure of this meeting would jeopardize the FBI's investigation, Rainsy
consented not to reveal the convocation of the interview. In
his account of the events on March 30, 1997, Rainsy noted the unusual presence of
military forces and a lack of regular police forces. This
arrangement was counter to the RGC deployment during his 14 previous
demonstrations in Phnom Penh. On May
14, 1997, the FBI re-interviewed Rainsy
in Cambodia in conjunction with the RGC investigators. No
additional investigative information was gathered as a result of this
interview.
On the evening of
Investigation to date failed to develop evidence that the
1. That the FBI's sketch artist and one FBI agent return to the
2. That the local media be advised that the
3. That an FBI agent remain in
4. That the FBI provide the Commanding General written
investigative leads which need to be completed to resolve the investigation.
5. That the investigative commission regularly submit
their investigative reports to the FBI representative.
6. That the Co-Deputy Prime Ministers submit a formal
letter requesting the above-outlined FBI investigative assistance.
7. That no statement be made to the Cambodian media
regarding the FBI representative.
8. That if the Cambodian Police fail to initiate or
accomplish the FBI's recommended investigatory steps within "a reasonable
period of time, then the police should provide a
statement as to cause.
9. That the status of the investigation be re-addressed
with the investigative commission within 14 working days. If
no significant progress was made by that time, then
the presence of the FBI representative would be terminated after 30 working
days.
10. That the commission immediately use the composite
sketches provided by the FBI by publishing them and presenting them to all
potential subjects and witnesses.
Ambassador Quinn approved the 10 recommendations. In addition, Co-Minister of the
Interior Sar Kheng and Sam Rainsy both concurred with the FBI's role as outlined in
the third recommendation.
On
On
On May 22, 1997, Rainsy asked the ICA for a copy of the investigative report. Rainsy was informed that the ICA could not accede to
Rainsy's request. Rainsy
expressed unhappiness and some anger at the fact that he would not be given a
copy of any FBI reports on this investigation. Rainsy
became even more agitated when the ICA informed Rainsy
that there were genuine questions about the allegations and motives of the
grenade throwers. Rainsy then suggested that the FBI
agent should be careful because he might become a target for violence. Rainsy also predicted that another violent
incident might occur in the near future.
On May 27, 1997, Sam Rainsy
conducted a press conference in which he linked the FBI's investigation to a
"Preliminary Report" which Rainsy claimed pointed to Second Prime Minister Hun Sen as the culprit of the March 30, 1997, attack. Rainsy also
claimed to have a RGC "confidential report", given
to him by First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh, substantiating Rainsy's
claim of Hun Sen's culpability.
During the FBI's presence in Cambodia, 56 interviews were conducted by the FBI. Twenty-nine interviews were with the joint
FBI-Cambodian coalition, six interviews with only the
FUNCINPEC police present, and 21 interviews were
conducted privately with US Embassy personnel present. All
the interviews were conducted with the Ambassador's knowledge. Some
of the witnesses interviewed spoke English. For those
interviews which required a translator, translations
were provided by either FUNCINPEC General Bornlay, CPP
General Keo Sopheak, or one
of two US Embassy personnel. Seven of the private
interviews of witnesses were translated by Rainsy.
The two Embassy translators provided translations for 24 of the interviews that
were conducted with the Cambodian officials. The FBI's
sketch artist produced nine sketches while in the company of the investigative commission. Three of the sketches (one of each suspect),
were provided to the Cambodians. On May 29, 1997, the
sketches were published in the Cambodian media.
On June 19, 1997, Legat Bangkok met with Ambassador Quinn, Co-Ministers of the Interior Sar
Kheng and You Hockry and Ok
Serei Sopheak, advisor and
Director of Cabinet to Sar Kheng. Legat
Bangkok advised that the FBI was interested in obtaining any reports or results
of the investigation generated by the investigative commission and any
information about a suspected grenade-thrower identified as "Brazil." Cambodian press reports identified "Brazil" as a participant in the March 30, 1997, attack who
was apprehended by Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) Deputy Chief of Staff Lt
General Nhek [sic] Bun Chhay
(FUNCINPEC) on June 1, 1997, and held in General Bun Chhay's
custody. "
On June 20, 1997, Legat Bangkok met with Sar Kheng, You Hockry and the investigative
commission. Legat Bangkok received two investigative
reports on the March 30, 1997, attack, in Khmer, prepared
by the commission. Legat Bangkok forwarded these
reports to FBIHQ for translation. Both Ministers
stressed that all information generated from the investigation should be kept
from the Cambodian press. Minister Hockry
noted that the commission had received some information by telephone about the
March 30, 1997, attack since the publication of the composite sketches. Minister
Hockry advised that he would write a report based
upon his notes from the phone calls to the commission and to himself and
provide the report to the FBI. Hockry mentioned that
"Brazil" had not been arrested by General
Bun Chhay and that, contrary
to press reports, "Brazil" had made no
admissions of involvement in the March 30, 1997, attack.
Between July 4 and July 6, a coup led by CPP Prime
Minister Hun Sen's military forces overthrew the
reigning government in
Fighting continued for the following weeks as Hun Sen's
forces fought FUNCINPEC's forces. Several
US citizens were held up in hotels and residences throughout
Unconfirmed reports from
On
On June 4,1998, Legat Bangkok met in the US Embassy Bangkok with Saumara Rainsy [sic ] (wife of
Sam Rainsy) and two witnesses who claimed to have
information on the March 30,1997 attack - Chhay Vee and Chom Bon Theun (aka Chum Bun Thoeun).
According to Chom Bon Theun, CPP party leader Heng Bon Hiang approached Chom Bon Theun in mid-March 1997 and asked Chom
Bon Theun to assist in a plot to launch a grenade
attack on the March 30 rally/demonstration. Chom Bon Theun advised Legat Bangkok that
he (Theun) helped Hiang
recruit the suspect "Brazil" and personally
recruited Chhay Vee. Chom
Bon Theun also noted that six or seven months after
the March 30 attack, he saw Brazil's corpse near a
military base in Tang Kasang.
During the June 4, 1998 interviews Saumara
claimed that Chhay Vee had
admitted to throwing one of the grenades at the rally. Chhay
Vee admitted to being recruited by Chom Bon Theun to throw grenades
at the March 30 demonstration in return for payment. Chhay
Vee also stated in the interview that Chom Bon Theun knew Sam Rainsy personally. Both Chhay Vee and Chom
Bon Theun informed Legat
Bangkok that they voluntarily decided to confess their involvement to Sam Rainsy, possibly in return for money.
On November 13, 1998, Legat Bangkok and RSO Phil Whitney, with
the assistance of Khmer language translator Yarong Van, re-interviewed Chhay Vee and Chom Bon Theun. Both subjects advised that their previous statements
were false and that neither had anything to do with the March 30 attack. Chom Bon Theun stated that
Sam Rainsy Party official Eng Chhay
Eang provided him and Chhay
Vee with the story of their guilt. Eang
wrote a script for Chom Bon Theun
to memorize which was roughly the same story Theun
provided to Legat Bangkok on June 4. Chom Bon Theun advised that Eang offered
to him and Chhay Vee
$15,000 each in return for telling the false story about their participation in
the attack to the UNCHR, FBI and others.
All investigative findings are complete. The FBI has
presented its investigative findings to the Department of Justice for a prosecutive opinion.